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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND CONTROLLING LAW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b )( 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee 
Wilshire Insurance Company presents the following issues pertinent to this appeal: 
Issue I. Did the trial court properly rule that Fleetwood was not Wilshire's agent where 
the undisputed facts are that Fleetwood is an insurance broker which was not authorized to 
bind coverage for Wilshire, Fleetwood acted as an agent of Espenschied, and Fleetwood 
placed coverage for Espenschied with various insurers over a period in excess of twenty 
years? 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). [The Court] review[s] the district court's grant or denial of 
summary judgment for correctness, drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party."' Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ruthe,ford, 2017 UT 
25, ,r 5, 395 P.3d 143, 145. 
Controlling Law: A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if"there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Issue II. Did the trial court properly rule that the insurance policy did not provide coverage 
when the undisputed facts showed that the policy was a scheduled vehicle policy and the 
trailer was not scheduled on the policy? 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). [The Court] review[s] the district court's grant or denial of 
summary judgment for correctness, drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party."' Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ruthe,ford, 2017 UT 
25, 15, 395 P.3d 143, 145. 
Controlling Law: A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if "there is no genuine Gi) 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter has been ongoing since January 30, 2005, when a trailer hauled by non-
party DATS Trucking ("DATS"), an interstate motor carrier, lost dual tires while traveling 
on a highway. (R. 2088-92, R. 1860-61 ). After coming off the axle, the tires crossed a 
median and struck another vehicle-resulting in the death of that vehicle's driver, Kimball 
Herrod (the "Accident"). (R. 2088-92, R. 1860). Prior to the Accident, DATS had 
purchased almost all of Appellant Espenschied Transport Corp.' s ("Espenschied") assets. 
(R. 2130). For tax reasons, DATS was leasing the Espenschied trailer involved in the 
2 
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• 
Accident, while having a contractual obligation to eventually purchase the same. (Id.) 
At the time of the Accident, DATS had liability insurance and eventually paid 
$2,264,000.00 to Mr. Herrod's family in settlement of a lawsuit filed against the trucking 
company. (R. 2122-28). Mr. Herrod's family (the "Herrod Family") also brought suit 
against Espenschied, the owner of the trailer at issue (the "Trailer"). (R. 1861, R. 2112-
13 ). Prior to the Accident, Espenschied had obtained liability coverage for certain of its 
vehicles through a scheduled-auto-only insurance policy issued by Appellee Wilshire 
Insurance Company ("Wilshire"). (R. 1920). Appellee Fleetwood Services, Inc. 
("Fleetwood") was Espenschied's long-time insurance agent, and had helped Espenschied 
obtain the Wilshire policy (R. 1856-57, R. 1873, R. 1-2) . 
After Espenschied made a claim related to the Accident, Wilshire undertook an 
investigation and denied coverage because the Trailer was not listed on the subject policy's 
schedule of covered autos. (R. 2098-101, R. 2852-62, R. 1908-09, R. 2102). Neither 
Fleetwood nor Espenschied ever requested the Trailer's addition to the policy. (R. 2102). 
Espenschied, itself, never paid a penny to the HeITod Family. Rather, in 2007, in 
settlement of the Herrod Family's claims, Espenschied agreed to: 
i) a confession of judgment in favor of the Herrod Family in the amount of 
$1,100,000.00 (payable on the date of the Confession of Judgment in the amount of 
$1,292,499.99 together with interest accruing thereafter at 10% per annum); 
ii) retain the services of the law firm representing the Herrod Family; 
• iii) relinquish control of all matters pe11aining to Espenschied' s claims against 
Wilshire; and 
3 
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iv) apply any proceeds from litigation against Wilshire to the Herrod Family in full 
satisfaction of the judgment amount before receiving any monies. (R. 2116-18, R. 2131- <9 
32). The Herrod Family, in tum, agreed not to collect the judgment from Espenschied, if 
to do so would expose its principals to liability. (R. 2131-32). 
Thereafter, the Herrod Family brought suit against Wilshire in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah, seeking money under the Policy's MCS-90 Endorsement on 
the basis that the subject policy did not provide coverage for the Action (the "Federal 
Action"). (R. 2171-72). The Federal Action ultimately resulted in the District Court ruling 
that the MCS-90 Endorsement did not apply, because Espenschied had ceased operating as 
an interstate motor carrier before the Accident. Herrod v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 2014 WL • 
6871259, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 5, 2014). The District Court therefore entered summary 
judgment in favor of Wilshire. Id. A state action brought by Espenschied against Wilshire 
and Fleetwood was held in abeyance during the course of the Federal Action. 
After resolution of the Federal Action, the Herrods (through Espenschied) resumed 
the prosecution of this state court case against Wilshire and Fleetwood. More specifically, 
Espenschied had filed claims against Wilshire for (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iii) breach of Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-26-
301; and (iv) breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 3-6). Importantly, each of these claims was 
precluded by a determination in the Federal Action that there was no coverage under the 
policy, which Plaintiff claims somehow survived the federal case but seems to have 
abandoned on appeal. 
This leaves only a vicarious liability argument for Espenschied, but Espenschied 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
never pled that Wilshire was vicariously liable for any allegedly negligent act or omission 
on the part of Fleetwood. Indeed, Espenschied expressly pled that Fleetwood was 
Espenschied 's agent, and did not assert anywhere in the Complaint that Fleetwood was 
Wilshire's agent. (R. 2). 
Thereafter, Wilshire filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Espenschied's 
claims, including any unpled allegations of vicarious liability. (R. 1824-26). Wilshire 
successfully asserted that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 
the subject insurance policy provided coverage for the Accident because the Trailer was 
not scheduled on the policy. (R. 3184-85). Therefore, there could be no breach of contract, 
fiduciary duty, or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing stemming from 
Wilshire's declination to provide coverage for the Accident. Likewise, there could be no 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-26-301 (which in any event does not create a private 
cause of action against insurance companies). (R. 3184-87). Further, Wilshire showed that 
there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Fleetwood did not act as Wilshire's agent 
in connection with procuring insurance for Espenschied, because Wilshire did not control 
"the means or manner in which Fleetwood operated." (R. 3187). Thus, the Honorable Paige 
Petersen entered summary judgment against Espenschied and in favor of Wilshire. (R. 
3187-88, R. 3207-09). The Court further found that Wilshire could not be held vicariously 
liable for any of Fleetwood's allegedly negligent acts or omissions in any event, because 
Espenschied had no viable claims against Fleetwood. (R. 3187-88). 
Espenschied raises only one issue pertaining to Wilshire in this appeal: whether 
Fleetwood acted as an agent for Wilshire. At the trial level, Espenschied seemed to argue 
5 
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that its contention that the Trailer was covered by the subject policy remained viable. 
However, this argument was not meritorious and, further, has not been preserved on appeal. 
The Complaint does not contain a claim for refonnation of the subject policy. What remains 
of this case is simply a malpractice action against Fleetwood, Espenschied's insurance 
agent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Espenschied was an interstate bucking company established in 1982. (R. 1855, 
1858-59). For the majority of the time that Espenschied was in business, it used Fleetwood 
as an insurance agent. (R. 1856-57, R. 1873, R. 1-2). Espenschied's principals considered 
• 
Fleetwood their business partner and insurance broker and agent. (R. 2229, R. 2241, R. t 
2244). 
In December 2003, Wilshire issued a commercial lines insurance policy to 
Espenschied, Policy Number BA2493296 (the "Policy"). (R. 1920, R. 1885-86). The 
Policy was a "Scheduled Vehicle Policy", meaning that in order for a vehicle to be covered 
under the Policy, the vehicle must be listed or scheduled on the Policy. (R. 1888, R. 1914-
15, R. 1906-07). After working with Espenschied to create the list, Fleetwood provided 
the list of vehicles to Wilshire. (R. 1890-91, R. 1879-80, R. 2242-43 ). Fleetwood remitted 
a copy of the Policy to Espenschied, and Wilshire subsequently mailed monthly schedules 
of equipment to Espenschied identifying the equipment covered under the Policy. (R. 2849, 
R. 2916). Nonetheless, Espenschied failed to read its Policy: 
Mr. Donaldson: Did you have a file at Espenschied for insurance issues, [fJor example, 
policies, that kind of thing? 
6 
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Mr. Stark: Well, Fleetwood would typically send the policy in a book form each year. 
Mr. Donaldson: Okay. So you did receive typically-
Mr. Stark: Yeah. And it would go right on the shelf. 
(R. 2916). 
Fleetwood did not have the authority to bind Wilshire or write insurance policies on 
behalf of Wilshire. Rather, Fleetwood was required to submit proposed risks to Wilshire 
for consideration, with Wilshire then making the decision to bind on a case-by-case basis. 
(R. 1886--87, R. 1873-76, R. 2848, R. 2882). 
Similarly, both Wilshire and Fleetwood's representatives testified that Fleetwood 
lacked any authority to bind Wilshire: 
Mr. Humphreys: Who issues the binder? Is it the company or the agent? 
Mr. Matousek [of Wilshire]: The company issues the authority to bind. 
(R. 2882; see also R. 1886--87, R. 1874-76). 
James Morden, who is the founder and a former owner of Fleetwood (R. 1870-72), 
confirmed that Fleetwood never had this authority, and further that Fleetwood had placed 
insurance coverage on Espenschied's behalf with various insurers over the twenty-plus 
• years that Fleetwood had worked with Espenschied. (R. 1873-76, R. 1878). John Richard 
Stark, one of the founders and principals of Espenschied (R. 1855), likewise testified: 
Mr. Abbott: How long had you used Fleetwood? 
Mr. Stark: I don't recall how many years, but it was for the most part the 
only company we ever used. 
7 
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Mr. Abbott: Are we talking more than ten years? 
Mr. Stark: Oh, yeah. 
Mr. Abbott: More than 20 years? 
Mr. Stark: Yes .... 
Mr. Abbott: And you understood that Fleetwood procured insurance 
through Wilshire; is that right? 
Mr. Stark: During this time or always? 
Mr. Abbott: At any time. 
Mr. Stark: They used a lot of companies over the years, and I don't-
Mr. Abbott: Okay. So Fleetwood was a broker, essentially? 
Mr. Stark: That's the way I understood it. 
Mr. Abbott: They would go to different companies and obtain the best 
insurance? 
Mr. Stark: Yeah. 
Mr. Abbott: So over the years, whoever the actual insurance carrier was 
would have changed from time to time; is that right? 
Mr. Stark: Uh-huh (affirmative). 1 
(R. 1856-57, emphasis added). 
Espenschied' s accountant also testified: 
[E]ventually everything started becoming automatic because 
[Espenschied] started working with [Fleetwood] directly-not directly-
consistently on here are [sic] the first couple of times. [Espenschied] 
would kind of go out and get bids from different carriers. But after several 
1 Mr. Humphreys objected to the use of the term "broker" as constituting a legal opinion. 
8 
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times, finding out the way that [Fleetwood] worked, the way [Fleetwood] 
was familiar with everything, [Espenschied] found it to be more of a 
headache to go back in. So [Espenschied] just decided to stay with 
[Fleetwood] all along. [Fleetwood] shopped different carriers or different 
providers on that. ... [Espenschied] just turned [Fleetwood] loose with it 
at that point. And [Espenschied] used different insurance companies. 
(R. 2221-22). 
Fleetwood was responsible for producing less than fifty percent of Wilshire's 
insurance policies in Utah. (R. 2881). Wilshire did not require Fleetwood to use any 
particular forms for submitting insurance applications, and indeed, Fleetwood used 
ACORD forms-forms which are standard in the insurance industry and not proprietary to 
Wilshire. (R. 2849, 2883). Although Wilshire held programs and meetings with insurance 
brokers such as Fleetwood, the purpose of the meetings was to market Wilshire's products 
to Fleetwood and to gain a better sense of the local market and competitor's products. (R. 
<i) 2849). 
On December 31, 2004, Espenschied sold its business to DATS and ceased 
operating as a motor carrier. As part of the deal, Espenschied agreed to lease its fleet of 
trailers to DATS, and DATS agreed to eventually purchase the same. (R. 2130). 
Thereafter, on or about January 30, 2005, DATS was hauling one of the trailers it 
had leased from Espenschied when dual tires came off an axle. (R. 2088-92, R. 1860-61 ). 
The tires crossed a highway median and struck another vehicle-resulting in the death of 
that vehicle's driver, Kimball Herrod. (R. 2088-92, R. 1860). 
The Herrod Family filed a wrongful death action against Espenschied and DATS 
arising from the Accident. (R. 1861, R. 2112-13). The case settled before trial, and DATS 
9 
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paid the Herrod Family $2,264,000.00 in exchange for a full release. (R. 2122-28). 
Espenschied, in tum, agreed to a confession of judgment in the amount of $1,100,000.00 <ii 
payable on the date of the confession of judgment in the amount of$1,292,499.99, together 
with interest accruing thereafter at I 0% per annum. (R. 2116-18). The settlement 
agreement entered into by and between Espenschied and the Herrod Family explicitly 
provided that the judgment could not be collected against Espenschied (if to do so would 
expose Espenschied's principals to liability). (R. 2131-32). Espenschied has thus never 
paid any money to the Herrod Family. 
On or about May 16, 2006, after investigating Espenschied's claim for coverage, 
Wilshire determined that the Trailer was not listed on the schedule of covered autos and (I) 
that the Policy, therefore, did not provide coverage for the Accident. (R. 2098-101, R. 
2852-2862, R. 1908-09, R. 2102). Neither Espenschied nor Fleetwood ever requested 
Wilshire to add the Trailer to the Policy. (R. 2102). 
Thereafter, the Herrod Family filed a Complaint against Wilshire in the Federal 
District Court for the District of Utah seeking policy limits from Wilshire under the 
Policy's MCS-90 Endorsement.2 (R. 2171-72). In a summary judgment motion filed by 
2 
"The MCS-90 endorsement constitutes such proof of requisite financial responsibility 
under the [Motor Carrier Act]. Consequently, every liability insurance policy issued to ~ 
motor carriers of interstate commerce contains the MCS-90 endorsement. The MCS-90 
endorsement, in pertinent part, provides that the motor carrier's insurer agrees to pay, 
within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the 
insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use 
of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of ... the [MCA] 
whether or not the vehicle involved in the accident is specifically described in the policy. 
The motor vehicles that are subject to the financial responsibility requirements are those 
vehicles used for the transportation of property by motor carrier or motor private carrier. 
10 
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the Herrods, they argued that the Trailer was not a scheduled vehicle on the Policy and that 
the Policy did not provide coverage for the accident as a prerequisite to the triggering of 
the MCS-90. (R. 2174, R. 2186). 
Ultimately, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Wilshire on 
the grounds that Espenschied had ceased its transportation services prior to the Accident 
and was existing solely to lease its trailers to DATS, the trucking company that had 
purchased all of Espenschied's other assets; therefore, Espenschied was not operating as a 
for-hire motor carrier at the time of the Accident, rendering the MCS-90 Endorsement 
inapplicable. Herrod v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6871259, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 5, 2014). 
Prior to the decision in federal court, Espenschied had filed a motion for summary 
judgment in the state court action, relying on an "undisputed fact" that the Trailer "was not 
included on the Wilshire Policy's list of scheduled vehicles." (R. 2196). However, 
Espesnchied withdrew this motion before it was decided. It was not until the decision in 
federal court adverse to Espenschied that Espenschied changed course, arguing that the 
The MCS-90 endorsement is intended to impose a surety obligation on the motor carrier's 
insurer-in other words, the endorsement is a safety net that covers the public in the event 
other insurance coverage is lacking. An insurer's obligation to pay a negligence judgment 
against its insured pursuant to a MCS-90 endorsement is triggered only when (1) the 
underlying insurance policy to which the endorsement is attached does not otherwise 
provide coverage, and (2) either no other insurer is available to satisfy the judgment against 
the motor carrier, or the motor carrier's insurance coverage is insufficient to satisfy the 
federally-prescribed minimum levels of financial responsibility." 
Herrod v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 499 F. App'x 753, 755-56 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
11 
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Policy should have provided coverage to the Accident. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Wilshire is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, because the undisputed 
facts demonstrate that Fleetwood was not acting as Wilshire's agent with regard to the 
procurement of insurance coverage for Espenschied. Fleetwood never had authority to bind 
coverage on behalf of Wilshire. Rather, Fleetwood would fill out the initial insurance 
application and submit the same to Wilshire for the insurer's approval. Wilshire made the 
ultimate decision whether or not to issue coverage. Fleetwood only performed ministerial 
tasks on behalf of Wilshire. 
If Fleetwood acted as anyone's agent, it was for Espenschied. Fleetwood obtained 
insurance coverage for Espenschied for over twenty years and placed coverage with 
various insurers for Espenschied. Because Fleetwood does not constitute an "agent" of 
Wilshire pursuant to well-established law, Wilshire cannot be held vicariously liable for 
any alleged negligent acts or omissions of Fleetwood. 
Espenschied failed to properly brief the remaining issue it presented to the Court: 
that the Trailer could be covered by the Policy even if it was not specifically named; 
therefore, this issue should not be considered by the Court. In any event, there is no genuine 
dispute that the Trailer was not listed on the Policy's vehicle schedule and that the Policy 
was a scheduled vehicle policy; therefore, there can be no coverage for the Trailer under 
the Policy. Further, any knowledge Fleetwood had regarding adding the Trailer at issue to 
the Policy cannot be imputed to Wilshire, because Fleetwood was not Wilshire's agent 
with regard to procuring the Policy. 
12 
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• 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
i> Wilshire, and dismissal of all causes of action against Wilshire, should be affirmed. 
• 
ARGUMENT 
Espenschied disputes two factual findings by the Trial Court: 
a. "The Wilshire Policy was issued and underwritten based on an application 
and information provided by Espenschied to Fleetwood which in tum 
submitted the information to Wilshire." (Appellant's Br. 31, citing R. 3184). 
b. "Fleetwood did not have the authority to bind or write insurance for 
Wilshire." (Appellant's Br. 31, citing R. 3184). 
As to the first fact, Espenschied contends that it "submitted to Fleetwood a full list 
of all of its vehicles to be insured" and that "it was Fleetwood who changed the list and 
submitted a deficient list of vehicles to Wilshire." (Appellant's Br. 31). Notably, 
Espenschied does not contend that Wilshire changed the list or that Wilshire had knowledge 
of the list outside of what was provided to it by Fleetwood. Espenschied's argument thus 
rests on whether Fleetwood was Wilshire's agent acting within the scope of that agency at 
the time of the policy formation. The undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that 
Fleetwood was not Wilshire's agent. 
I. The trial court properly ruled that Fleetwood was not Wilshire's agent. 
A. The "reasonable expectations" doctrine has been rejected in Utah. 
As an initial matter, in its brief, Espenschied argues: 
There is adequate evidence that Fleetwood was Wilshire's agent. See 
Statement of Facts, ,r,r 16-22, supra. Where an agent has represented the 
interests of both the insurer and the purchaser in a transaction for 
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procurement of insurance coverage, the insurer cannot later assert that the 
policy purchased does not cover a loss, if the purchaser expected that the 
policy would cover the loss and reasonably relied on the agent to ensure that 
the policy covered the loss. O/szak v. Peerless Ins. Co., 119 N.H. 686, 406 
A.2d 711 (1979). 
(Appellant's Br. 32-33). In making this argument, Appellant ignores the fact that this Court 
has expressly rejected the "reasonable expectations" doctrine espoused in O/szak, a 1979 
New Hampshire Supreme Court decision. 
In O/szak, the owner of a construction business brought suit against an insurance 
company seeking coverage for a slip and fall claim the insurer claimed was not covered 
pursuant to a "completed operations" exclusion. Id., 119 N.H. at 688,406 A.2d at 713. The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the loss should be covered based on the 
"reasonable expectations rule": "(i)f a policy is so constructed that a reasonable man in the 
position of the insured would not attempt to read it, the insured's reasonable expectations 
will not be delimited by the policy language, regardless of the clarity of one particular 
phrase, among the Augean stable of print." O/szak, 119 N .H. at 689-90, 406 A.2d at 714 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Atwood v. Hartford Acc. & 
Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636,637,365 A.2d 744, 746 (1976) (The "reasonable expectations" 
doctrine is a policy honoring the "objectively reasonable expectations of the insured ... 
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those 
expectations."). 
Importantly, in that case, unlike the present matter, "all parties agree[ d] that [the 
insurance agent] was acting as agent for both the plaintiff and the [insurance] company." ®il 
Id. at 689, 406 A.2d at 714. Even more significantly, this Court has already expressly 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rejected the "reasonable expectations" doctrine, concluding that an insured has a duty to 
read its policy: 
In making this ["reasonable expectations"] argument, [the alleged insured] 
asks us to adopt a doctrine that considerably modifies the legislatively 
expressed public policy underlying the regulation of the insurance industry. 
The theory she advances essentially would allow a court to invalidate a clear 
provision of an insurance contract, even if the insured had not read it, if the 
finder of fact is convinced that the insurer's agent knew or should have known 
that the insured had expectations that contradicted the policy's language and 
that the agent created or helped to create those expectations. For the reasons 
set forth below, we decline to make such a change in Utah law. 
Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992); see also W. 
United Ins. Co. v. Heighton, 2016 WL 4916785, at *3, n. 1 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2016), appeal 
<i dismissed sub nom. Western United Insurance v. PHH Mortgage (Oct. 12, 2016) ("[T]he 
reasonable expectations doctrine has been rejected in Utah."). 
Moreover, this is not an instance wherein a policy exclusion was buried "among the 
{i Augean stable of print"3; rather, the schedule of vehicles explicitly did not include the 
Trailer. (R. 2852-62). Fleetwood remitted the completed Policy to Espenschied and 
Wilshire subsequently mailed monthly schedules of equipment to Espenschied identifying 
the equipment covered under the Policy. (R. 2849, 2916). Nonetheless, Espenschied failed 
to read its Policy: 
Mr. Donaldson: Did you have a file at Espenschied for insurance issues, [f]or example, 
policies, that kind of thing? 
Mr. Stark: Well, Fleetwood would typically send the policy in a book form each year. 
3 Olszak, 119 N.H. at 689-90, 406 A.2d at 714. 
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Mr. Donaldson. Okay. So you did receive typically-
Mr. Stark: Yeah. And it would go right on the shelf. 
(R. 2916) 
After failing to review the Policy and corresponding vehicle schedule, Espenschied 
cannot now claim that it "reasonably expected" the Trailer to be covered. See Kramer v. 
State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 351, ,r 25, 195 P.3d 925, 931 ("[The insurer] could not have 
violated the reasonable expectation doctrine because such a doctrine does not exist under 
Utah law."); id. at ,r 25 (holding that insureds had a duty to review Master Policy before 
signing enrollment form because it was identified in the form as the actual contract of 
insurance). 
B. Fleetwood was not acting as Wilshire's agent in connection with the 
procurement of the Policy. 
Further, there is no genuine dispute regarding the fact that Fleetwood could not bind il 
coverage on behalf of Wilshire; that Fleetwood served as Espenschied's insurance agent, 
rather than as an agent for Wilshire; and that Fleetwood had placed coverage with various 
insurers on behalf of Espenschied for over twenty (20) years. Thus, the record clearly 
demonstrates that Wilshire did not control the "means or manner in which Fleetwood 
operated" (R. 3187) and that Fleetwood was not acting as Wilshire's agent as to the 
procurement of the Policy. See Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
In Vina, a lessee and sublessee of a tavern met with an insurance agent to discuss 
obtaining insurance coverage on the tavern and equipment therein. Id. at 583. The 
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insurance agent obtained a quote for insuring the tavern from an insurance company, and 
• then filled out and submitted a questionnaire to the insurer on behalf of the alleged insureds. 
Id. The insurance company (through a general agency) issued a policy based on the 
questionnaire. Id. Thereafter, the sublessee cancelled the insurance without the lessee's 
consent or knowledge. Id. The trial court held that the insurers were entitled to rely on the 
insurance agent's representation that the sublessee had the power and authority to cancel 
the insurance policy without the lessee's authorization. Id. at 584. On appeal, the plaintiff 
argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the insurance broker was not an agent of 
the insurer: 
~ According to [the lessee], [the insurance agent] was the agent of [the insurer] 
and [the general agency] and his negligence in misinforming [the insurer] 
that [ the lessee] and [ the sub lessee] were a partnership and in cancelling the 
policy without [the lessee's] knowledge or consent should be attributed to 
[ the insurer] and [ the general insurance agency]. 
<i Id. Examining the argument under Utah's "statutory4 and general agency law" the Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's findings. Id. The court noted that the insurance 
agent "had no authority from [ the general insurance agency] to bind insurance coverage or 
to issue a policy, but could only do so with [the agency's] express permission on a case by 
case basis." Id. The Court also examined general agency law: 
An agent is a person authorized by another to act on his behalf and under his 
control. The existence of an agency relationship is determined from all the 
facts and circumstances in the case. An insurance agent, so far as the insurer 
is concerned, is a person expressly or impliedly authorized to represent it in 
dealing with third persons . . . [ and] is commissioned and employed by an 
insurance company to solicit and write insurance by and in the name of the 
4 The statute discussed in Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N. Y., 761 P .2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2 ( 1985), has been repealed. 
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company. However, [a]n insurance broker, like other brokers, is primarily 
the agent of the first person who employs him and is therefore ordinarily the 
agent of the insured as to matters connected with the procurement of the 
insurance. Further, an independent agent who solicits insurance for the 
insured and places that insurance with an . . . insurance company is, if 
anyone's agent, the agent of the insured and not of the insurance company. 
Id. at 585 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Applying these principles, the 
Court concluded that the insurance agent had acted on behalf of the lessee, not the insurance 
company. Id. The Court reasoned that "[t]he circumstances establish a course of conduct . 
• 
. . where [the plaintiff] authorized [the agent] to act for him in regard to all of his insurance (i) 
needs. Furthermore, the facts do not indicate that [ the general agency] or [ the insurer] 
authorized [the insurance agent] to act for them to any significant degree, except to perform 
ministerial acts. He could not act on their behalf to establish or alter the business 
relationship between [the insurer] and [the plaintiff]." Id. at 586. 
Likewise, in PHL Variable Ins. Co., a Utah federal district court noted that 
Utah courts draw a distinction between insurance agents and insurance 
brokers. An insurance agent is typically a person expressly or impliedly 
authorized to represent [the insurer] in dealing with third persons ... [and] is 
commissioned and employed by an insurance company to solicit and write 
insurance by and in the name of the company. An insurance broker, by 
contrast, is ordinarily the agent of the insured as to matters connected with 
the procurement of the insurance. An independent agent who solicits 
insurance for an insured and places that insurance with an insurance company 
is, if anyone's agent, the agent of the insured and not of the insurance 
company. 
PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Sheldon Hathaway Family Ins. Tr. ex rel. Hathaway, 2013 WL 
6230351, at *6 (D. Utah Dec. 2, 2013), affd, 819 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Applying these principles, the court held that an insurer was not bound by the 
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representations of a licensed insurance producer and a broker, in spite of the existence of 
written agreements between the producer and insurance company and the broker and 
insurance company-agreements which were respectively titled "Independent Producer 
Contract" and "Brokerage General Agent Agreement", and contained provisions "about 
the use of company property, indebtedness and indemnification, and refund of premiums . 
. . . " Id. The court concluded that without the ability to "unilaterally bind [the insurer] into 
issuing an insurance policy to [ the alleged insured] before [ the alleged insured] first 
submitted an application to [ the insurer]" the producer and broker could not be agents of 
the insurer. Id.; see also Myers v. All. for Affordable Servs., 371 F. App'x 950, 956 (10th 
Cir. 2010) ("[A]n agent who is limited to receiving and accepting proposals for insurance 
is not a general agent and has no power to bind an insurance company or write insurance."). 
The undisputed facts in the matter at hand are similar to the circumstances in Vina 
and P HL. As an initial matter, Fleetwood NEVER had the authority to bind coverage on 
behalf of Wilshire, as testified by representatives of Fleetwood and Wilshire. 
Espenschied argues that an excerpt from the written contract between Fleetwood 
~ 
and Wilshire gives Fleetwood the authority to bind. However, the agreement specifically 
limits this "authority" to that "granted by the most current written instructions from the 
<i> Company Underwriting Department." (R. 2206). Wilshire never gave Fleetwood the 
authority to bind coverage, and instead required that Fleetwood submit proposed risks for 
approval on a case-by-case basis. (R. 1886--87, R. 1873-76, R. 2848, R. 2882). As set forth 
<i> above, representatives of both Fleetwood and Wilshire-the only parties to the contract-
testified that Fleetwood never had the authority to bind Wilshire. As to this issue, there is 
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thus no material dispute of fact. Rather, the undisputed facts show that the contract between 
Wilshire and Fleetwood is similar to the relationship described in Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. 
of N.Y., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), i.e., Fleetwood could only bind insurance on 
a case by case basis after receiving written instructions from the Wilshire underwriting 
department. As stated in Vina, this does not create an agency relationship. 
In addition, the agreement specifically provides that Fleetwood "is an independent 
contractor and not an employee of [Wilshire]" and that Fleetwood is "free to exercise his 
own judgment as to the persons to whom he shall sell insurance and the time, place and 
manner of such solicitations. [Fleetwood] shall have exclusive control of his time, the 
conduct of his agency and the selection of companies he will represent." (R. 2206). 
Fleetwood' s role was thus relegated to ministerial tasks such as preparing the paper binder 
and submitting the application and information to Wilshire: 
Mr. Humphreys: Who issues the binder? Is it the company or the agent? 
Mr. Matousek:5 The company issues the authority to bind. 
(R. 2882). 
Mr. Humphreys: To what extent did Fleetwood, based on your 
understanding, have authority with Wilshire to write or bind risks? 
Mr. Morden6: My recollection of the Wilshire contract was that it did not 
extend binding authority to the agents .... 
Mr. Humphreys: ... I'm trying to get an understanding of why it was 
that you entered into a contract if you had no binding authority. What 
5 At the time of the deposition, Mr. Matousek was a vice president of Wilshire Insurance 
Company. (R. 2848). 
6 Mr. Morden is the former owner of Fleetwood. (R. 1870-72). 
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authority did you have that was granted to you as you understood it? 
Mr. Morden: In our business, markets were king. If you had the market 
you ruled. They gave us the opportunity to have them as a market. ... 
Mr. Humphreys: So specifically gave you the exclusive right in your 
market area to write the Wilshire policies. 
Mr. Morden: There was nothing-no agreement that it was exclusive. 
But if we were able to produce an adequate amount of business for them, 
they would have no need to ask another agent to also have a contract. ... 
Mr. Humphreys: Did Fleetwood ever have the authority to bind with any 
company? 
Mr. Morden: Fleetwood itself, I don't believe so. 
Mr. Humphreys: Why do you qualify it? Were there individuals? 
Mr. Morden: Because I, as an individual, had binding authority with 
Farmers Insurance Group .... 
Mr. Humphreys: In terms of your historical experience with 
Espenschied-I understand you had various insurers that insured them 
overtime- .... 
Mr. Morden: We had them insured with Farmers Insurance for a long 
time .... 
(R. 1874-76, 1878). 
Espenschied's representative likewise understood that Fleetwood had acted as its 
agent in procuring insurance, and indeed had procured coverage for Espenschied for over 
twenty years from various insurers: 
Mr. Abbott: How long had you used Fleetwood? 
Mr. Stark: I don't recall how many years, but it was for the most part the 
only company we ever used. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Abbott: Are we talking more than ten years? 
Mr. Stark: Oh, yeah. 
Mr. Abbott: More than 20 years? 
Mr. Stark: Yes .... 
Mr. Abbott: And you understood that Fleetwood procured insurance 
through Wilshire; is that right? 
Mr. Stark: During this time or always? 
Mr. Abbott: At any time. 
Mr. Stark: They used a lot of companies over the years, and I don't-
Mr. Abbott: Okay. So Fleetwood was a broker, essentially? 
Mr. Stark: That's the way I understood it. 
Mr. Abbott: They would go to different companies and obtain the best 
insurance? 
Mr. Stark: Yeah. 
Mr. Abbott: So over the years, whoever the actual insurance carrier was 
would have changed from time to time; is that right. 
Mr. Stark. Uh-huh (affirmative). (Objection by Mr. Humphreys). 
(R. 1856-57). 
Although the record clearly demonstrates that Fleetwood was not acting as 
Wilshire's agent in procuring insurance coverage on behalf of Espenschied, Espenschied 
attempts to create a factual dispute where none exists. Specifically, Espenschied alleges 
that Fleetwood "produced almost all of Wilshire's Utah business" (App. 's Br. 35). This is 
plainly contradicted by the record. Wilshire used various brokers in Utah to place coverage 
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(R. 2879-81) and Wilshire's representative estimated that Fleetwood was responsible for 
producing less than fifty percent of Wilshire's insurance policies in Utah. (R. 2881). 
Further, as demonstrated by the record cited above, Wilshire and Fleetwood never had an 
exclusive relationship. 
Espenschied also argues that Wilshire provided Fleetwood with certain forms it had 
to use; that Wilshire held training meetings for its producers; and that Wilshire "provided 
requirements with which it expected its producers to comply." (App. 's Br. 35-36). 
However, the forms submitted by Fleetwood to Wilshire were ACORD forms-forms 
which are standard in the insurance industry and which were not required by Wilshire. (R. 
2849, 2883). Moreover, the purpose of the meetings between Wilshire and Fleetwood was 
to market Wilshire's products to Fleetwood and to gain a better sense of the local market 
and competitor's products. (R. 2849). There is no evidence that Wilshire controlled the 
means and method over which Fleetwood procured insurance coverage on behalf of its 
clients. 
In sum, the record clearly demonstrates that Fleetwood could not bind Wilshire 
except on a case by case basis after having received written authorization from the 
underwriting department; that Espenschied expected Fleetwood to obtain the best 
insurance it could for Espenschied; that Fleetwood procured insurance on behalf of 
Espenschied from various insurers over a twenty-plus year period; and that Fleetwood had 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no authority to act on behalf of Wilshire to any significant degree.7 Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilshire as to 
Espenschied' s unpled vicarious liability claim. 
C. Espenschied failed to plead any agency or vicarious liability theories in 
its Complaint against Wilshire. 
Although not relied upon by the Trial Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in re Wilshire's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3183-89), this Court should 
affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilshire, because all of the causes of 
action against Wilshire are precluded and Espenschied failed to plead vicarious liability in 
its Complaint against Wilshire. Espenschied pled that Fleetwood "acts as an agent for 
insureds in obtaining and managing their insurance needs" (R. 2, emphasis added) and that 
"Defendant Wilshire has been the insurer of plaintiff and Fleetwood has been the specific 
agent who has been acting in {sic/ behalf of and for plaintiff regarding its insurance 
needs" (R. 2, emphasis added). Revealingly, the Complaint does not contain any similar 
allegations regarding the relationship between Fleetwood and Wilshire-that is, that 
• 
• 
Fleetwood acted as Wilshire's agent at any time or that Wilshire should be held vicariously <t> 
liable for any negligence on the part of Fleetwood. Likewise, there are no causes of action 
asserted against Wilshire for statutory liability or liability under an agency theory. 
Moreover, the Court did not allow Espenschied to amend its Complaint to add any 
7 In any event, as an insurer, Wilshire cannot be held vicariously liable for a breach of an 
insurance agent's duty to procure insurance, because an insurer has no duty to procure 
insurance. 
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allegations of vicarious liability or agency. 8 Espenschied is therefore barred from bringing 
• any claims against Wilshire based on a vicarious liability theory this late in the litigation. 
For example, in Big Sky Fin. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 2006 UT App 337, an 
appellant argued, inter alia, that the district court erred in holding that an amended 
complaint failed to sufficiently plead claims for liability under an agency theory. The 
appellant asserted that under Utah's liberal pleading rules, the appellee had been put on 
notice of the vicarious liability claim. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court, reasoning: 
[T]he 2002 Amended Complaint makes no mention or reference to any 
statutory or agency theory claims, and does not articulate a single fact that 
would support such liability. Indeed, it does not even assert that [the alleged 
agent] was [appellee's] agent for escrow purposes. Thus, [appellee] did not 
have notice of either the statutory or agency theory claims, and the district 
court did not err in concluding that the 2002 Amended Complaint asserted 
only a fraudulent nondisclosure claim against [appellee]. 
Id.; see also William Chase Wood v. World Wide Ass'n. of Specialty Programs & 
OSchoolds, Inc., 2007 WL 1202714, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 20, 2007) {"The Complaints are 
also devoid of any specific allegations regarding any basis for vicarious liability. To 
establish vicarious liability, it is not enough to allege that an entity is vicariously liable for 
the actions of another. Instead, Plaintiffs must allege all of the elements of the particular 
theory, such as alter ego, upon which such vicarious liability is based."). 
Thus, because Espenschied failed to plead any cause of action against Wilshire 
~ 8 Espenschied actually moved the trial court to allow it to amend the pleadings "to conform 
to the evidence of an agency relationship" in its response to Wilshire's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 2612-13). The court never granted this request. 
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based on agency, or even plead that Fleetwood was Wilshire's agent, Espenschied is 
precluded from bringing any claims against Wilshire arising from Fleetwood' s alleged 
negligent acts or omissions. 
D. If the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Fleetwood is 
affirmed, the grant of summary judgment to Wilshire must likewise be 
affirmed. 
Finally, if this Court affirms the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Fleetwood, the grant of summary judgment to Wilshire must also be affirmed on the basis 
that Wilshire cannot be vicariously liable for any allegedly negligent act or omission on 
the part of Fleetwood if it is determined that Fleetwood has no liability. 
II. The Policy does not provide coverage for the Accident, because the Trailer 
was not scheduled on the Policy which was a scheduled vehicle policy. 
A. Espenschied has failed to brief this issue; therefore, it is not preserved 
for review. 
In its "Issues Presented for Review" Espenschied notes the following issue: "Did 
the trial court err by ruling as a matter of law that there could only be coverage under the 
Wilshire insurance policy if the trailer in question was specifically named in the policy?" 
(Appellant's Br. 2). However, Appellant does not actually brief this issue in the Argument 
section of its brief. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24, Appellant must 
identify the issues for review. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
[P]etitioners seeking judicial review must identify the legal or factual errors 
of the lower court or agency. We have consistently declined to review issues 
that are not adequately briefed. And we have long held that it is improper to 
mak[ e] blanket assertions and leav[ e] the responsibility to the court to ferret 
out evidence from the record to support [them]. 
26 
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-.s 
In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ,r 40, 175 P.3d 545, 555 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env't v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah 
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49, if 19,391 P.3d 148, 154 ("As part of their burden of 
persuasion, the Petitioners were required, in their opening brief, to indicate the specific 
parts of the [] final order they believed were incorrect and present supporting evidence. 
They completely failed to do so, and an appellant may not thereby dump the burden of 
argument and research on the appellate court." (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
Here, Appellant has failed to present any substantive argument on this issue; 
therefore, this issue is not preserved for appeal and the Court should decline to hear any 
argument pe11aining to the same. 
B. There is no evidence in the record that the Trailer was scheduled on 
the Policy. 
Even if the Court does consider this issue, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Wilshire must be affirmed. "An insurance policy is merely a contract 
between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the same rules applied to 
ordinary contracts." Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
"[I]f the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Benjamin 
v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, if 14, 140 P.3d 1210, 1213. 
Here, the policy of insurance issued by Wilshire to Espenschied was a "Scheduled 
Policy." (R. 1888-89; R. 1914; R. 1906-07). In this regard, the Policy provides that 
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Wilshire "will pay all sums an 'insured' legally must pay as damages because of 'bodily 
injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies, caused by an 'accident' and 
resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered 'auto."' (R. 1935-36). "This 
policy provides the following coverages for which an entry in the premium section is 
indicated .... Only those 'autos' described in Item Three of the Declarations for which a 
premium charge is shown ( and for Liability Coverage any 'trailers' you don't own while 
attached to any power unit described in Item Three)." (R. 1933-35). Thus, under the 
unambiguous policy language, in order for the Policy to provide coverage for bodily 
injuries arising from an accident, the involved vehicle must be scheduled on the Policy. 
Here, it is undisputed that the Trailer was not scheduled on the Policy at the time of the Ci 
Accident. (R. 2848-2862,9 R. 2097-2101, R. 2108-09). Moreover, as set forth in detail 
above, Fleetwood was not acting as Wilshire's agent in connection with the procurement 
of the Policy, and any alleged knowledge on the part of Fleetwood regarding Espenschied's 
desire to schedule the Trailer cannot be imputed to Wilshire.10 Therefore, there is no 
coverage under the Policy for the Trailer and Wilshire is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
9 The Trailer at issue was identified in Plaintiffs Complaint as a "1986 Timpte trailer" (R. 
2). This trailer is not listed on the Policy's schedule. 
10 In addition, the testimony on record reveals that Espenschied sent Fleetwood three 
separate vehicle lists, all of which listed different equipment. (R. 2899-2900). Mr. Morden, 
of Fleetwood, then visited with Espenschied to determine the equipment to schedule (R. 
2900). The final equipment list submitted to Wilshire did not include the Trailer. (R. 2848-
2862, R. 2097-2101, R. 2108-09). 
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.I 
In sum, the Honorable Paige Petersen properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Appellee Wilshire Insurance Company, because Fleetwood was not acting as Wilshire's 
agent with regard to the formation and procurement of the Policy, and as such, cannot be 
held vicariously liable for any of Fleetwood's allegedly negligent acts or omissions. In 
addition, any knowledge of Fleetwood cannot be imputed to Wilshire. Therefore, Wilshire 
requests that this Court affinn the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilshire and the 
dismissal of all causes of action against Wilshire. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2017. 
Nelson Abbott (#6695) 
Abbott Law Firm 
3651 North 100 East, Ste. 350 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801) 374-3000 
Robert D. Moseley (admitted pro hac vice) 
Smith Moore Leatherwood 
2 West Washington Street, Ste. 1100 
Greenville, SC 29601 
Attorneys for Wilshire Insurance Company 
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Counsel hereby certifies the Brief of Appellee Wilshire Insurance Company complies with 
the type-volume limitation: 7,926 words are contained herein, in compliance with UTAH 
R. APP. P. 24(f)(l)(A) as determined by the word processing system used to prepare Brief 
of Appellee Wilshire Insurance Company. ~~ 
s/ Nelson Abbott 
Nelson Abbott (#6695) 
Abbott Law Finn 
3651 North 100 East, Ste. 350 
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• 
• 
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Michael A. Gehret 
Ben T. Welch 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Fleetwood Services, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
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• 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in re Wilshire's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
See Addendum of Appellant Espenschied Transport Corp . 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
(a) Motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A party may move 
for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or 
defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment 
if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record 
the reasons for granting or denying the motion. The motion and memoranda must follow 
Rule 7 as supplemented below. 
(a)(l) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary judgment (i) 
must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed. Each fact 
must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and supported by citing to materials in 
the record under paragraph ( c )( 1) of this rule. 
( a)(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing the motion 
must include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is disputed 
with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing to materials in the 
record under paragraph ( c )( 1) of this rule. The memorandum may contain a separate 
statement of additional materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in 
numbered paragraphs and similarly supported. 
(a)(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a concise 
statement of facts, whether disputed or undisputed, for the limited purpose of providing 
background and context for the case, dispute and motion. 
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(a)(4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing the motion 
• under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) that is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes 
of the motion. 
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment at any time 
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party or after 21 days from 
the commencement of the action. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may move for summary judgment at 
any time. Unless the court orders otheiwise, a party may file a motion for summary 
(i) judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the close of all discovery. 
(c) Procedures. 
(c)(l) Supporting factual positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely 
disputed or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 
( c )(1 )(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, 
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, 
or other materials; or 
6t) (c)(l)(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 
genuine dispute. 
(c)(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party may object 
that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would 
be admissible in evidence. 
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(c)(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may 
consider other materials in the record. 
( c )( 4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a 
motion must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible 
in evidence, and must show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the 
matters stated. 
( d) When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party. If a nonmoving party shows by 
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 
its opposition, the court may: 
( d)( 1) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice; 
( d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or 
( d)(3) issue any other appropriate order. 
(e) Failing to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly support an 
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by 
paragraph (c), the court may: 
(e)(l) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 
(e)(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 
(e)(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--including the facts <i 
considered undisputed--show that the moving party is entitled to it; or 
(e)(4) issue any other appropriate order. 
(f) Judgment independent of the motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to @ 
respond, the court may: 
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(f)(l) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party; 
• (f)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or 
• 
(f)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts 
that may not be genuinely in dispute . 
(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the relief 
requested by the motion, it may enter an order stating any material fact--including an item 
of damages or other relief--that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as 
established in the case. 
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an affidavit or 
declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court--after 
notice and a reasonable time to respond--may order the submitting party to pay the other 
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, it incurred as a result. The court 
may also hold an offending party or attorney in contempt or order other appropriate 
sanctions. 
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